Wednesday, August 01, 2007

NYT: "A War We Just Might Win"

In a surprising Op-Ed printed in the New York Times, of all places given the paper's constant criticism of the war in Iraq and of President Bush, positive news from the battle front is actually printed. This report may indeed be a very significant part of our future debates about the right course of action in Iraq. Two analysts from the liberal Brookings Institution, Michael O'Hannon and Kenneth Pollack, present their findings from a recent visit to Iraq in "A War We Just Might Win":

We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.

After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done....

But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).

In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.

In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.

The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.

In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.

Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.

In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.

Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.

In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.

How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.

[Michael E. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings.]

1 comment:

Cabe said...

I trust that many of their points are valid, but again I am very hesitant to place much faith in an 8-day investigative tour of Iraq that likely consisted of brief, if any, substantive trips beyond green or secure zones. Allow me to address and respond-yes, from my armchair- to some of their claims that I find particularly troubling and almost laughable given the byzantine and complex nature of the struggle in Iraq.

“A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark. “
-I fail to see the relevance or weight that this holds given that they omitted the name and city. How many mayors are in Iraq? Is one mayor representative of the rest? Are all mayors cooperative and sympathetic to the coalition forces? Rory Stewart, please enter the fray here.


“many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed," -Where is the evidence of this? How many is many? 10, 100, 1,000?

"Iraqis have stepped up to the plate,"
-How sadly anecdotal can one be in their reporting? Am I supposed to place my faith in a brief baseball analogy? This statement seems tragically inadequate.

"Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor."
-this reminds me of John McCain a while back. They managed to walk down a few streets without armor and back home I'm supposed to believe that this is indicative of other struggles in a country of millions with more than a few towns and provinces.

"In war sometimes it's important to pick the right adversary and in Iraq we seem to have done so."
-I find this statement to be incredibly inadequate and irresponsible. Given the complexity of this war, I'm simply aghast at the absurdity of this statement at this point in time.

"morale is high"
-Where and from whom have I heard this before? Tour extensions, post traumatic stress syndrome, broken families etc... I doubt that morale is “high”, but I hope this statement is true.

“Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services -- electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation -- to the people. “

-Everywhere' seems a bit hyperbolic. Where is 'everywhere'?

“As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration's miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily "victory" but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.”

-Sustainable stability. How about a bit more information on what this would realistically entail? However, I hope this a fair and accurate statement.





In conclusion, I found their article to be woefully inadequate and anecdotal. Eight days of reporting by two analysts behind the guard of military might? I do believe a good bit of it, but if I'm going to believe most it, I'd prefer a bit more than passing sports references and sweeping generalizations made in a mere week after hanging with military protection. But, alas, this what we must rely on for information in Iraq. I'm glad that they found progress being made in Iraq, and I'm hopeful that more progress can be made. But this article seemed too disturbingly simplistic, vague and suggestive to be viewed as an honest and thorough assessment from which to form well-rounded opinions about the Iraq war. But I think these two experts lost me from the start with their title: “A war we just might win”. Perhaps they are equipped to explain what winning would entail. This again I fear is another failed sports analogy. The bottom line for me? How about the statement: “the more I learn the more I realize I don't know”. It appears that the most experienced and knowledgeable folks who have apolitically and experientially explored the issue of Iraq would likely rest on that statement. I don't think those two analysts have reached that point yet; but maybe they have, in which case I look forward to their next piece.

Cabe Vinson